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This article examines where Brussels parliamentary members live, looking at the evo-
lution of this phenomenon over the past 20 years. The central question focuses on 
whether different neighbourhoods within the Brussels Capital Region also experienced 
a different pattern of representation throughout this period. The analysis shows that 
the centrally located poor neighbourhoods had little if any representation at the end of 
the 1980s, but that this underrepresentation gradually decreased and has now just 
about completely disappeared. The increasing number of parliamentary members of 
non-European origin has played a role in this evolution, but other parliamentary mem-
bers are also increasingly living in centrally located neighbourhoods. Furthermore, 
historical anchoring in certain areas continues to play a role. There are major differ-
ences between the political ideologies which broadly follow a left-right continuum, and 
which are also increasing. The increasing representation of the central urban neigh-
bourhoods simultaneously creates opportunities and challenges for urban policy. Al-
though a lack of policy interest in these neighbourhoods is becoming increasingly 
unlikley, this does not necessarily go hand in hand with an increase in the amount of 
attention paid to the current residents within these neighbourhoods.
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Introduction
An earlier contribution to this journal (De Maesschalck, 2009) examined the areas 
within which Brussels municipal councillors live on the basis that much scientific 
attention has been paid to the social composition of political representation, but 
much less to the social composition of their immediate surroundings, the neigh-
bourhoods where they live. This analysis showed that the poorest neighbourhoods 
are markedly underrepresented and that there is a global increase in representation 
the more prosperous a neighbourhood is. However, there are also major differences 
between the political ideologies depending on their position within the political spec-
trum. The overrepresentation of prosperous neighbourhoods is stronger for right 
wing parties and the opposite is seen for left wing parties. A comparison of where 
municipal councillors from the previous legislature live, which was previously ana-
lysed by Borman et al. (2001), additionally shows that these trends were also in ex-
istence at that time, although the increasing presence of elected members of non-
European origin has now increased the representation of the poorest neighbour-
hoods somewhat. This group is gradually being given more access to the political 
party lists in an attempt to attract the anti-racist and ethnic segments of Brussels 
voters. Furthermore, there also seems to be a difference between policy levels, with 
a higher average level of prosperity for the Brussels parliamentary members than for 
the municipal councillors. Jacobs (2006) and Van Hamme & Marissal (2008) previ-
ously examined where the elected Brussels parliamentary members live and also 
found that the poorest neighbourhoods were underrepresented. However, these 
studies mainly focused on the candidates, revealing that this underrepresentation is 
stronger for those who are ultimately elected than for the candidates themselves, 
partly due to the position that the candidates have on the list and partly due to fewer 
candidates from poor neighbourhoods on the main lists.
An empirical analysis of the situation at one moment in time was conducted as part 
of the aforementioned studies. This article similarly aims to establish whether where 
new parliamentary members live reflects the aforementioned underrepresentation of 
the poorest neighbourhoods.
However, this contribution goes one step further by also providing an analysis of the 
evolution over the past twenty years, which also happens to be the age of the pre-
sent Brussels Capital Region. The socio-spatial polarisation within the Brussels 
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Capital Region, which was already greater than in all other Belgian cities, increased 
significantly throughout these twenty years (Loopmans & Kesteloot, 2009). This 
socio-spatial polarisation goes hand in hand with historical processes of 
autochtonous depopulation and the immigration of foreign economic migrants to the 
central area of the region who filled the gaps within the employment and housing 
markets in addition to the impoverishment of this group who were affected the most 
by the economic crisis (Keseloot, 2000). Autochtonous depopulation, foreign immi-
gration and problems on the employment market are still important processes in the 
central area of Brussels and this so-called ‘poor crescent’ contrasts increasingly 
sharply with the wealthy areas in the South-East. Processes of gentrification have 
taken place within the centre over the past few years (Van Criekingen, 2009), but 
this has not been the case for the most impoverished neighbourhoods. This increas-
ing socio-spatial polarisation makes the question of the political representation of 
the various neighbourhoods all the more relevant in Brussels and also helps to ex-
plain why the limited attention that is paid to this phenomenon mainly focuses on 
Brussels. The aforementioned studies all refer to the relationship with the pursuant 
policy, from the hypothesis that the place of residence has an impact on the percep-
tion of the area and also ultimately on political decision-making. Although Van 
Hamme & Marissal (2008) rightly observe that the impact of the living environment 
on the perception of the area can actually be demonstrated, but that this is less true 
for the impact that this perception has on political decision-making - which actually 
requires different and specific data – a clear link has been made on several occa-
sions between where parliamentary members live and the policy that is ultimately 
implemented (De Maesschalck, 2010). More generally, this study fits within a re-
search tradition that examines the extent to which proportional election systems 
lead to geographically representative results (see Latner & McGann, 2005). In major-
ity systems, such as in the UK where each district provides one representative, this 
geographical representation is integrated within the electoral system, precisely in the 
interests of spatial representation (Pedersen et al., 2004).
The place of residence of the present Brussels parliamentary members is analysed 
in the first part of this contribution. The second part examines the evolution of par-
liamentary representation over the past twenty years. Median income and the level 
of deprivation are used to first establish the extent to which the neighbourhoods 
where parliamentary members live are representative for the Brussels area as a 
whole, for both the present legislature as well as for the historical evolution. The 
extent to which the neighbourhoods in difficulty are represented is subsequently 
examined. A distinction is continually made between the various political ideologies 
and attention is also paid to the impact of the increasing number of elected mem-
bers of non-European origin.1 A number of conclusions are made in the final section 
and possible policy implications are discussed. The data was collected using par-
liamentary documents, always in the year following elections. This enables the ac-
tual composition of the parliaments to be examined as at that moment in time, Min-
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1  The changes over time are mainly a result of the admission of new members of parliament. 
Indeed, the large majority of re-elected parliamentary members do not move house. The num-
ber of new parliamentary members is reasonably stable over time, always fluctuating between 
45% and 50%. The fluctuations can be greater for individual political ideologies and mainly 
depend on the number of new seats that were gained.
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isters, State Secretaries and other elected members who for a whole variety of rea-
sons have not taken up their mandates have already been replaced by their succes-
sors. As the Dutch-speaking representation is not large enough to justify a separate 
analysis, the Dutch and French-speaking parliamentary members are grouped ac-
cording to the same political ideology. The following political ideologies were distin-
guished: Social Democrats (PS, SP and the later sp.a), Liberals (PRL, PVV and the 
later VLD and Open VLD), Christian Democrats (PSC and the later cdH, CVP and 
the later CD&V), Greens (ECOLO, AGALEV and the later Groen!), Extreme Right (FN, 
FNB , VLAAMS BLOK and the later VLAAMS BELANG), FDF, Flemish Nationalists 
(VU, spirit, NVA) and Independents. In the case of mixed lists (PRL-FDF in 1995, 
PRL-FDF, VLD-VU-O and SP-AGA in 1999, sp.a-spirit and MR in 2004, and MR in 
2009), the members of parliament were split up according to their membership of 
one of the mixed parties.
1. Where the present Brussels parliamentary members live
1.1. Is this representative of the Brussels Capital Region?
The neighbourhoods where the parliamentary members live were typified on the 
basis of two variables: the first being the median income2 and the second being an 
index of deprivation. This index was established by Vandermotten et al. (2006) and 
was constructed on the basis of 22 variables which measure deprivation in terms of 
the employment market, health, housing and education. These variables have an 
average value of 0 with a value of 1 (or -1) representing a deviation in positive (or 
negative) terms from the average by one standard deviation. The average value of 
zero applies to all the Belgian metropolitan districts, but the average value is signifi-
cantly lower for the Brussels Capital Region at -0.4. Figure 1 shows the average 
median income and the average index of deprivation in the neighbourhoods where 
parliamentary members live according to political ideology. The size of each circle 
denotes the extent of parliamentary representation. The average for all parties to-
gether is also indicated. The axes are formed on the basis of average income and 
the average index of deprivation in the Brussels Capital Region as a whole.3 
Figure 1 shows that the FDF and the Extreme Right are both situated significantly 
above the average for the region as far as income and the index of deprivation are 
concerned. The Liberals are positioned just above average. In contrast, the Christian 
Democrats show slightly lower than average values. This is even more pronounced 
for the Social Democrats and particularly for the Greens. This results in a general 
value for all parties together which falls below the average for the region, both in 
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ductable expenses. Net income is the income before taxes such as payroll tax are deducted 
but after social security contributions (NSSO) have been deducted.
3 The Flemish Nationalists only had one elected member and are therefore not shown here.
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terms of income and the index of deprivation.4 As was the case for the municipal 
elections, we are also able to observe differences between the political ideologies 
which run globally along a left-right continuum, although the Greens have lower 
values here than the Social Democrats. As was also the case for the municipal elec-
tions, the Extreme Right are not found in the outer limits. In contrast to the other 
ideologies, Extreme Right mainly has Dutch-speaking elected members who more 
often live in the less prosperous western part of the region.
The analysis of where municipal councillors live also revealed that elected members 
of non-European origin tended to live in significantly poorer neighbourhoods. 27% of 
the members belong to this group5 within the Brussels parliament. Figure 1 has 
been redrawn in order to establish whether the same observations apply here; how-
ever, the group of parliamentary members of non-European origin are shown sepa-
rately (Figure 2).
Figure 2 shows that for each political ideology, the level of prosperity within the 
neighbourhoods where the parliamentary members of non-European origin live is 
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4  This order applies to both the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking representation (not 
counting the Dutch-speaking Christian Democrats and Liberals, who change place), but the 
Dutch-speaking representation is positioned at a significantly lower level. This is partly ex-
plained by the fact that they mainly live in the less prosperous western part of the region. 
5  This group was delimited using data from Pierre-Yves Lambert (http://suffrage-universel.be) 
and concerns origin in its broadest sense. It can also cover second or third generation mi-
grants. 
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Figure 1. Incomes and index of deprivation in the neighbourhoods where parliamentary members live, according to political 
ideology, 2009.
lower than that for the other parliamentary members, both in terms of income and 
also in terms of the index of deprivation. Compared to the Brussels average, this 
results in a lower than average value for the first group and an above average value 
for the second group. It is also striking that the differences between the political 
ideologies are largely the same when both groups are considered separately. This 
means that a certain selection is also taking place according to ideology amongst 
the people of non-European origin, even though intrinsic as well as political objec-
tives play a role for all political parties concerned in including this group on the lists 
(Bousetta, 2006). Furthermore, the differences between both groups are relatively 
small, especially in comparison to the municipal elections. The greatest differences 
can be seen within those ideologies that have a higher average level of prosperity. 
This is particularly noticeable for the Christian Democrats.
1.2 The representation of neighbourhoods in difficulty
These average values can, however, conceal different spatial patterns. For example, 
an average value that indicates an average level of prosperity can mean overrepre-
sentation in neighbourhoods with an average level of prosperity, but it can equally 
mean overrepresentation of both very deprived and very prosperous neighbour-
hoods. This is why the proportion of parliamentary members who live in neighbour-
hoods in difficulty is also examined. These neighbourhoods were delimited by Van-
dermotten et al. (2006) using the index of deprivation and were classified into differ-
ent types: migrant neighbourhoods in significant difficulty, neighbourhoods experi-
encing slight difficulty, neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification, where a dynamic 
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Figure 1. Incomes and index of deprivation in the neighbourhoods where parliamentary members live, according to political 
ideology, 2009.
is prevalent of renovation and middle class immigration, and other neighbourhoods 
in difficulty (especially social neighbourhoods). Table 1 shows the overrepresentation 
or underrepresentation of these different neighbourhood types and also of the 
neighbourhoods that are not in difficulty for each political ideology. In concrete 
terms, the proportion of parliamentary members in these neighbourhoods was di-
vided by the proportion of the population in these neighbourhoods. A value of 1 
therefore indicates perfect representation; a higher value signifies overrepresentation 
and a lower value signals underrepresentation.
This table shows that neighbourhoods that are not in difficulty are slightly overrepre-
sented. 58% of the parliamentary members live in these neighbourhoods, whilst the 
percentage of the population comes to less than half. This overrepresentation spe-
cifically applies to the FDF and Extreme Right (who have no representation in neigh-
bourhoods in difficulty), to the Liberals and also to the Christian Democrats, al-
though it seemed earlier that they had an average lower income and a lower level of 
deprivation than for the region as a whole.
The Christian Democrats are actually overrepresented in neighbourhoods experienc-
ing slight difficulty. In contrast to these ideologies, the Greens and the Social Demo-
crats are underrepresented in neighbourhoods that are not in difficulty. The Greens 
are overrepresented in neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification, which was also 
the case for the municipal elections whilst both ideologies are overrepresented in 
migrant neighbourhoods in significant difficulty, which consequently also applies to 
all parties together. The presence of elected members of non-European origin plays 
a role here as this overrepresentation actually disappears when this group is not 
taken into consideration. However, the overrepresentation of migrant neighbour-
hoods in significant difficulty still remains, also for parliamentary members of Euro-
pean origin belonging to the Green and Social Democrat parties even though this is 
less pronounced. For the Christian Democrats, only elected members of non-
European origin live in these neighbourhoods.
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All parties 1,18 1,06 0,60 0,91 0,26
Social Democrats 0,89 1,67 0,80 0,65 0,94
Greens 0,79 1,74 - 2,26 -
Liberals 1,43 0,61 0,79 0,48 -
Christian Democrats 1,16 0,75 1,43 0,58 -
FDF 2,03 - - - -
Extreme Right 2,03 - - - -
% of the population 49,30 19,10 15,00 12,30 4,30
Table 1. Overrepresentation and underrepresentation of neighbourhoods in difficulty, 2009
The Chi²-test gives a P value of 0.03999. Without Extreme Right, which only has three parliamentary members, this becomes 0.02412. 
This means that we are able to state with 95% certainty that the members of parliament are distributed differently across the various neigh-
bourhood types than the population as a whole.
Although the neighbourhoods in difficulty are slightly underrepresented, this trend is 
less pronounced than for the municipal councillors. Furthermore, the average in-
come is also lower and the average index of deprivation is higher for parliamentary 
members, also when the parliamentary members of non-European origin are not 
taken into consideration. Apart from the FDF and the Extreme Right, these differ-
ences also apply to all political ideologies, even though the differences between the 
political ideologies remain. These relatively low values can be linked to the central 
areas where these parliamentary members often live as the poorest and most de-
prived neighbourhoods are located within the central part of the region. This is a 
new piece of information as in the past it was always concluded that the level of 
prosperity in the neighbourhoods where the parliamentary members live was higher 
than that of the municipal councillors. The following section provides a more in-
depth examination of these changes and the historical evolution of parliamentary 
representation since the first direct election of the Brussels parliament is also con-
sidered.
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels
 7
F. DE MAESSCHALCK, « Towards urban representation?
Where Brussels parliamentary members live, 1989-2009 », 
Brussels Studies, Issue 44, 22 November 2010, www.brusselsstudies.be
2. A historical perspective
Over the past 20 years the balance of political power in the Brussels Capital Region 
has naturally not remained the same. The changing proportions also have an influ-
ence on the representation of the different neighbourhoods as this is strongly de-
pendent on political ideology. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the balance of political 
power over the past 20 years. This is not based on absolute figures as the number 
of parliamentary members increased in 2004 from 75 to 89 and therefore cannot be 
compared over time. Figure 3 shows that the representation of the Social Demo-
cratic and Green parties experienced an overall increase, although there are a num-
ber of sizeable dips in the course of both parties that partly cancel out each other. 
Extreme Right grew steadily, but experienced a sharp decline in 2009. The other 
parties have a more stable curve with an overall loss for the Liberals and the FDF 
(although the latter experienced a slight resurgence in the final year), and a V-
shaped curve for the Christian Democrats.
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Social Democrats Greens Liberals Christian Democrats
FDF Extreme Right Flemish Nationalists Independents
Figure 4. Index of deprivation in the neighbourhoods where parliamentary members live, according to political ideology, 
1989-2009
2.1. Towards a reflection of the Brussels area?
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the average index of deprivation over the years in 
the neighbourhoods where the parliamentary members live according to the differ-
ent political ideologies.6 A steady decrease in the average level of prosperity can be 
seen for all parties combined from 1999 onwards which now even falls below the 
average for the region. The decrease in the level of prosperity is particularly striking 
for the Greens and the Social Democrats who already had relatively low values at 
the start of the period under consideration. Moreover, the Greens have fallen below 
the level of the Social Democrats. The Christian Democrats’ falling curve is also very 
striking. They had the highest average level of prosperity in 1989, but now have a 
value that is lower than the regional average. The Liberals have also had a falling 
curve since 1999, but the drop is less marked. It is also striking that they still had 
relatively low values at the beginning of the period under consideration. The FDF 
experienced an overall increase in the average level of prosperity which is particu-
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6  The index of deprivation was measured at one moment in time. This raises the question of 
whether the same evolutions would be seen if the level of prosperity were measured at the 
moment of representation itself. When the median income at the moment of representation is 
used rather than the index of deprivation, we see the same overall evolutions as in figure 4. 
This is linked to the strong level of inertia within the socio-spatial structure in Brussels (Roe-
sems et al., 2006): the social differences between the neighbourhoods do not just change from 
one year to the next.
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Christian Democrats FDF Extreme Right Average for BCR
Figure 4. Index of deprivation in the neighbourhoods where parliamentary members live, according to political ideology, 
1989-2009
larly marked from 2004 onwards. Finally, Extreme Right has a V-shaped curve. As a 
result of these developments, the existing differences between the political ideolo-
gies (Green and Social Democrats on the one side, FDF and Extreme Right on the 
other side with the Liberals in between) has clearly become greater over the course 
of time. The only exception to this are the Christian Democrats.
Considering the clear relationship that was stated earlier between the level of pros-
perity of the neighbourhoods and the origin of the parliamentary members, the 
question arises as to whether this declining trend is associated with the increasing 
presence of parliamentary members of non-European origin. The number of natural-
ized foreigners increased sharply during the period under consideration due to the 
gradual relaxation of naturalization procedures. This makes this group electorally 
strong and paved the way for the admission of candidates of foreign origin to the 
lists. The right for foreigners to vote does not actually apply for the regional elec-
tions. The presence of this group in the parliament gradually increased from 1% in 
1989 to 27% in 2009 and is particularly strong within the Social Democrats, Greens 
and Christian Democrats, the political ideologies for which the level of prosperity of 
the neighbourhoods shows a sharp decline (see table 2).7 
1989 1995 1999 2004 2009
Social Democrats 0 3 4 13 12
Greens 1 2 2 0 5
Christian Democrats 0 0 0 2 5
FDF 0 0 1 1 2
Liberals 0 0 1 0 0
Flemish Nationalists 0 0 0 1 0
Total 1 5 8 17 24
% of parliamentary members 1,3 6,7 10,7 19,1 27,0
Table 2. Number of Brussels parliamentary members of non-European origin, 1989-
2009
In order to be able to demonstrate this group’s impact, the evolution of the index of 
deprivation in the neighbourhoods where the parliamentary members live is shown 
once again in figure 5, but only for parliamentary members of European origin. Ex-
treme Right has the same curve as this ideology does not have any parliamentary 
members of non-European origin. By contrast, the FDF’s rising line is even more 
marked. Both the Liberals and the Christian Democrat retain a falling curve, but this 
is considerably less steep for the latter and they are now above the average for the 
region. There is a striking difference as far as the Greens and the Social Democrats 
are concerned; whilst the Greens now also have a sharply falling curve (which is 
even lower, apart from the last year), the Social Democrats largely remain at the 
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7  This group was also delimited on the basis of data from Pierre-Yves Lambert 
(http://suffrage-universel.be).
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same level until 2004 and it is not until 2009 that the fall also affects the parliamen-
tary members of European origin. It therefore looks like the parliamentary members 
of European origin have followed the parliamentary members of non-European origin 
in their choice of residence, albeit with some delay.8 The increasing rift between the 
Greens and the Social Democrats on the one hand and the FDF and Extreme Right 
on the other, with the Liberals in between, can also be seen here. However, the 
Christian Democrats now lean more towards the Liberals. 
2.2. The increasing representation of neighbourhoods in difficulty
As stated above, the average values can conceal different spatial patterns. For ex-
ample, an average level of prosperity can point to high levels of representation in 
neighbourhoods with an average level of prosperity. However, it may also be due to 
an overrepresentation of both very prosperous as well as very poor neighbour-
hoods. Figure 6 therefore shows the proportion of parliamentary members that do 
not live in neighbourhoods in difficulty according to political ideology throughout the 
entire period under consideration. Figure 6 shows that this value fell from 1999 on-
wards for all parties together, although they still remain well above the regional value. 
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8  The same observation applies for the Dutch-speaking representation, who with one excep-
tion, have no members of non-European origin; they show relatively stable values until 2004 
and it is only in 2009 that a sharp decline becomes discernable. 
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All parties Social Democrats Greens Liberals
Christian Democrats FDF Extreme Right Average BCR
Figure 5. Index of deprivation in the neighbourhoods where parliamentary members live, without parliamentary members of 
non-European origin and according to political ideology, 1989-2009
This value for the entire population only fell slightly from a maximum of 50.8% in 
1999 to a minimum of 49.3% now. As far as the different ideologies are concerned, 
similar developments can be seen within the average values, but the increasing con-
trast between the Greens and the Social Democrats on the one hand and the Ex-
treme Right and the FDF on the other is even more noticeable here. The Liberals 
and the Christian Democrats also now find themselves in the middle, although the 
Liberal’s lower value in 1989 is much more noticeable here. The value for the Chris-
tian Democrats may also be closer to that of the Liberals without the parliamentary 
members of non-European origin. Without this group, the decrease experienced by 
the Social Democrats only comes into effect in 2009 and the FDF curve is higher. 
A movement towards or departure from the centre can be surmised within these 
developments as the poorest and most deprived neighbourhoods are located in the 
centre of the region. A detailed analysis per political ideology is carried out in this 
final section through the use of figure 7, which shows which type of neighbourhoods 
in difficulty are represented per political ideology. Figure 8 charts where parliamen-
tary members live throughout the years, also according to political ideology. Even 
when different ideologies represent the same types of neighbourhoods in difficulty, a 
different spatial logic can still be in force which often has to do with a historically 
anchored presence within certain areas of the region. 
It earlier appeared that the Social Democrats and Greens have experienced an 
overall evolution towards stronger representation in neighbourhoods in difficulty, 
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All parties Social Democrats Greens Liberals
Christian Democrats FDF Extreme Right BCR population
Figure 6. Proportion of parliamentary members who live in neighbourhoods that are not in difficulty, according to political 
ideology, 1989-2009
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Figure 7. Number of parliamentary members according to type of neighbourhood in difficulty for the different political 
ideologies, 1989-2009
Neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification N. in slight difficulty Migrant n. in significant difficulty
Other n. in difficulty N. not in difficulty
which are now even overrepre-
sented. In the case of the Social 
Democrats, this can be ex-
plained to a large extent up to 
2004 by the admission of par-
liamentary members of non-
European origin, but since 2009 
this is also the case for the other 
parliamentary members. The 
impact that this group has had is  
much smaller for the Greens. 
However, we are able to deduce 
from figure 7 that the neighbour-
hoods undergoing gentrification 
are more strongly represented 
for this ideology than for the 
Social Democrats and that mi-
grant neighbourhoods in signifi-
cant difficulty have been repre-
sented by the Social Democrats 
right from the beginning of the 
period under consideration. This 
goes hand in hand with several 
striking spatial differences (see 
figure 8). For example, the Social 
Democrats have a classically 
strong presence in several mu-
nicipalities along the canal, such 
as Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, where 
they are also electorally strong, 
whilst the Greens have a notice-
able concentration in the South-
ern and South-Eastern neigh-
bourhoods of the first belt where 
gentrification and upgrading of 
former middle-class neighbour-
hoods is relatively prevalent.9 In 
both cases, the representation of 
the most central areas along the 
canal is largely a recent phe-
nomenon.
Compared to the other parties, 
the Liberals had a large propor-
tion of parliamentary members in 
neighbourhoods in difficulty in 
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9  Just like neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification, neighbourhoods undergoing upgrading 
have a strong dynamic of renovation and middle-class immigration, but with a less deprived 
starting position (Van Criekingen & Decroly, 2003).
F. DE MAESSCHALCK, « Towards urban representation?
Where Brussels parliamentary members live, 1989-2009 », 
Brussels Studies, Issue 44, 22 November 2010, www.brusselsstudies.be
1989. Figure 7 shows that this 
mainly involved neighbourhoods 
that are now undergoing gentrifi-
cation, often old middle-class 
neighbourhoods. However, by 
1995 the Liberal representation 
had largely left these neighbour-
hoods. Since then, the represen-
tation of neighbourhoods in diffi-
culty has increased slightly once 
again, just as for the Christian 
Democrats. However, this often 
involves neighbourhoods that do 
not accumulate the majority of 
the problems. For the Christian 
Democrats, where the difference 
between the parliamentary 
members of non-European origin 
and the others is the greatest in 
relative terms, the migrant 
neighbourhoods in difficulty are 
also only represented by the 
former group. Although there is 
therefore a cautious movement 
for both ideologies towards the 
more central areas, with a no-
ticeable presence in the East 
and the South-East areas of the 
first crown, both still have a rela-
tively important peripheral repre-
sentation (see figure 8). However,  
there is a noticeable difference in 
the peripheral location of both 
ideologies over the years. 
Whereas the Christian Demo-
crats have the strongest levels of 
representation in relative terms 
within the Eastern, traditional 
Christian Democratic side of the 
region, the presence of the Lib-
erals is also noticeable within the 
Southern middle-class axis, 
which is traditionally non-
denominational (Dobruszkes & 
Vandermotten, 2006).
In 1989, Extreme Right and the 
FDF had almost no representation within neighbourhoods in difficulty and subse-
quently experienced a somewhat increased level of representation only to return to 
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having no representation now. In 
the case of the FDF, this is partly 
to do with the (limited) admission 
of elected members of non-
European origin during those 
years. By contrast, this involved 
elected members of Belgian 
origin for Extreme Right. The fast 
growth of Extreme Right there-
fore went hand in hand with the 
admission of a number of par-
liamentary members who lived in 
neighbourhoods in difficulty. By 
2004, which was the pinnacle of 
their success, this trend was 
dwindling once again even 
though their propaganda clearly 
focused on the problems experi-
enced by these neighbourhoods. 
However, these parties differ 
greatly in spatial terms (see fig-
ure 8). The FDF has a very 
strong presence in the prosper-
ous Eastern and South-Eastern 
areas of the region whilst they 
are virtually absent from the cen-
tral districts, particularly recently. 
In relative terms, Extreme Right 
has a much stronger presence in 
the Western area of the region, 
which has to do with the rela-
tively important Dutch-speaking 
representation within this ideol-
ogy. More generally, it is notice-
able that Extreme Right is mainly 
present in the direct periphery 
around the central zone, where 
anxiety about the spread of the 
nearby urban diversity is very 
real. The success of Extreme 
Right in these neighbourhoods 
was observed by Vandermotten 
& Vanlaer (1993) and explains 
the overrepresentation of Ex-
treme Right within these neigh-
bourhoods (Van Hamme & Ma-
rissal, 2008).
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Figure 8. Spatial distribution of the parliamentary members for the different political 
ideologies, 1989-2009
Conclusion and discussion: towards urban representation, towards urban 
policy?
Despite the relatively small number of parliamentary members in each legislature (an 
individual elected member belonging to a small political ideology can therefore have 
a major impact on the result), there are still very clear and consistent developments 
that can be seen over time. The representation of less prosperous, more centrally 
located neighbourhoods has increased markedly over the past 20 years. In 1989, 
the number of parliamentary members living in such neighbourhoods was very lim-
ited. However, this was no longer the case in 2009. The average income and the 
average index of deprivation is now even lower than the regional average in the 
neighbourhoods where the parliamentary members live, although the proportion of 
parliamentary members living in neighbourhoods in difficulty is still smaller than for 
the Brussels population as a whole. There are obviously major differences between 
the political ideologies, which further increased during the period under considera-
tion. The Greens and the Social Democrats were still living in the least prosperous 
neighbourhoods, but this process clearly intensified from 1999 onwards. In the case 
of the Greens, this is linked to a preference for neighbourhoods undergoing gentrifi-
cation and their surroundings. For Social Democrats, this process is largely due to 
the increasing admission of parliamentary members of non-European origin, with the 
other parliamentary members only following this trend in 2009. In 1989, the Liberals 
still had a fairly strong level of representation in a number of neighbourhoods that 
are presently undergoing gentrification. However, this representation had completely 
disappeared by 1995. A cautious trend is once again visible from 1999 onwards 
towards less prosperous, more centrally located neighbourhoods, although this 
predominantly does not include neighbourhoods that accumulate the most prob-
lems. This declining trend is even more noticeable for the Christian Democrats, 
which for the most part can be explained by the admission of parliamentary mem-
bers of non-European origin. Historically, both parties have been located in different 
areas: the Christian Democrats are represented more strongly throughout the period 
under consideration within the traditional Catholic East side of the region, whilst the 
Liberals have a relatively stronger level of representation in the historically non-
denominational South. These political ideologies still have an important peripheral 
representation, but it is mainly Extreme Right and the FDF who now have a periph-
eral geography, just as they did at the beginning of the period. Extreme Right had a 
higher degree of representation in the more immediate periphery, close to the cen-
tral areas where the angst for the spatial spread of urban diversity is much stronger. 
The FDF almost exclusively represented the prosperous East and South-East. It is 
therefore not surprising that the FDF is strongly involved with the French-speakers in 
the periphery outside the Brussels Capital Region and the community questions that 
are linked to this area. This is not only a historical and strategic choice, the Brussels 
FDF parliamentary members also share the same socio-spatial ideology. 
In general, the growing presence of parliamentary members of non-European origin 
therefore means increasing central urban representation, often in neighbourhoods in 
difficulty. The effect of this group now means that migrant neighbourhoods in signifi-
cant difficulty are even slightly overrepresented. Other parliamentary members have 
followed much more gradually and particularly since the most recent elections. This 
is the case for the Greens (who had a strong representation in central districts rela-
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tively early on), Social Democrats and to a much lesser extent, the Liberals and the 
Christian Democrats. Consequently, the difference between parliamentary members 
of non-European origin and the other parliamentary members is now relatively small 
for both the Greens and the Social Democrats, but larger for the ideologies who 
have a higher average level of prosperity. This is particularly noticeable for the Chris-
tian Democrats. The increasing central urban representation of neighbourhoods in 
difficulty simultaneously offers opportunities and challenges for urban policy. They 
go hand in hand with a focus on urban regeneration within these neighbourhoods, 
which were often not able to count on much policy interest in the past. The increas-
ing number of parliamentary members of non-European origin, who have often 
grown up in these neighbourhoods, can also be a cause of significant concern for 
the current residents, even though this often comprises a local elite with an individ-
ual socio-economic status that is much higher than that of the neighbourhood as a 
whole (Van Hamme & Marissal, 2008). This higher socio-economic status also ap-
plies to the other elected members in these neighbourhoods, where it frequently 
involves immigrants. Some of them may also consider urban regeneration as a tool 
for making these neighbourhoods attractive for further middle class immigration. 
There are often underlying motives at work here, such as extending the municipal 
fiscal base and the presumed benefits of a social mix. For the time being, a large 
number of recent regional initiatives aimed at steering the future of these neighbour-
hoods are paving the way for gentrification, and it is not the poorest groups who are 
reaping most of the benefits (Decroly & Van Criekingen, 2009; Romainville, 2010). 
Concrete policy studies which fall outside the focus of this contribution must identify 
future developments. This contribution does show that the everyday surroundings of 
a large number of parliamentary members now fall within the focus of these devel-
opments more than ever before. This on its own makes a lack of policy interest 
highly unlikely. 
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